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Abstract 
The paper analyses the demise of the Rule of Law in the EU economic 
governance, after the reforms enacted to respond to the economic crisis that hit the 
region after 2008. The analysis engages critically with the marginal role played by 
the Court of Justice in this context and, in particular, when it comes to the protection 
of social rights in time of austerity. The paper demonstrates that this situation is 
only partially attributable to “external” constraints, such as the choice to resort to 
mechanisms that are outside the EU legal order or the strict requirements 
concerning the locus standi of private applicants that wish to challenge the validity 
of EU acts. So far, the Court has been unwilling to fully perform its role, even in those 
cases where it could have done so.  
 
 
1. Introduction: the reform of the European economic governance in 
response to the crisis  
The European response to the crisis revolved around two main axis1: financial 
assistance for Member States in difficulty and the creation of new mechanisms that 
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1 A third axis consists of measures aiming at creating a safer financial sector in the EU. These 
measures involved stronger prudential requirements for banks, improved depositor 
protection and rules for managing failing banks. They set the foundations for the creation 
of a European Banking Union. See A. Kern, ‘European Banking Union: a Legal and 
Institutional Analysis of the Single Supervisory Mechanism and the Single Resolution 
Mechanism’, European Law Review, 40, 2015, 154-187. 
may yield stronger economic coordination and tighter control on Member States 
economic choices.2 
Since 2008, eight European States have obtained financial assistance that has 
been provided through a variety of instruments. Early cases, involving non-euro 
States, such as Hungary, Latvia and Romania, received assistance on the basis of 
Article 143 TFEU, which envisages the possibility to grant “mutual assistance” to 
non-Eurozone States facing difficulties as regard its balance of payments. Vice versa, 
in the first Greek bailout package approved in May 2010 there was no EU mechanism 
available and, thus resources had to be provided through bilateral loans by 
Eurozone States and by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) under a stand-by 
arrangement.  
After this experience, the EU rushed to fill the gap, creating two new bailout 
mechanisms: the European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM) and the 
European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF). The former was established by 
Regulation No. 407/20103 and it had the capacity to borrow up to a total of 60 
million euros. The latter, endowed with more financial resources4, has been created 
by an international agreement and operates as a private company established in 
Luxembourg. Most of the resources used to provide financial assistance to Ireland 
and Portugal came from these sources. Conversely, the second adjustment program 
for Greece was entirely financed by the ESFS.   
The need to reduce the risk of contagion through the establishment of a credible 
firewall pushed Member States to create a permanent mechanism to provide 
financial assistance to Euro-Area Members experiencing or threatened by financing 
difficulties. The European Stability Mechanism5 was established on 27 September 
2012 with a maximum lending capacity of 500 million euros. The ESM intervened to 
provide assistance to Cyprus, together with a loan by Russia, and to Spain for the 
                                                          
2 See generally, A. Viterbo, R. Cisotta, ‘La crisi del debito sovrano e gli interventi dell’UE: dai 
primi strumenti finanziari al Fiscal Compact’, Il Diritto dell’Unione europea, 2012, 323-366; 
M. Ruffert, ‘The European Debt Crisis and European Union Law’, Common Market Law 
Review, 48, 2011, 1777-1806. 
3 Council Regulation (EU) No. 407/2010 of 11 May 2010, establishing a European financial 
stabilization mechanism, [2010] OJ L 118/1. 
4 It had the capacity to borrow up to a total of 440 million euros. 
5 The Treaty Establishing the European Stability Mechanism (‘ESM Treaty’) was signed in 
March 2012.  
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bailout of the financial sector. Furthermore, the ESM is also involved in the third 
financial assistance package for Greece, approved in August 2015. 
Each bailout entailed the respect by the beneficiary State of a set of policy 
conditions to be agreed with EU institutions, acting on behalf of the donors. 
Conditionality is a typical tool used by international financial institutions that serves 
different purposes. First, it aims to reduce moral hazard6 and to ensure that 
resources are used to solve the beneficiary State’s problems. Moreover, 
conditionality is also meant to protect the whole Eurozone against possible negative 
spill overs (the so-called ‘contagion effect’), safeguarding its long-term financial 
stability by making sure, inter alia, that the beneficiary State will be in the position 
to payback its loan. Lastly, tying financial support to the adoption of austerity 
measures purports to send a reassuring message to financial markets, by showing 
concerned States’ resolve in trying to address the root causes of the problem. 
The Commission and the European Central Bank (ECB) are key actors in the 
context of the Eurocrisis, being them part, together with the IMF, of the so-called 
Troika since the first economic adjustment programme for Greece. After these 
informal beginnings, their role has been recognized and codified in legal acts. For 
instance, Article 13(3) ESM Treaty establishes that, once it has decided to grant 
financial assistance, the Board of Governors “shall entrust the European 
Commission – in liaison with the ECB and, wherever possible, together with the IMF 
– with the task of negotiating, with the ESM Member concerned, a memorandum of 
understanding (a "MoU") detailing the conditionality attached to the financial 
assistance facility”.7  
The second axis of the European response to the crisis consists of the 
reinforcement of budgetary discipline by Member States and the creation of a new 
mechanism for stronger economic policy coordination.  
This has been achieved through a combination of EU legislative measures and 
international law treaties. As for the former, in November 2011 the European 
                                                          
6
 See specifically M. Ioannidis, ‘Europe’s New Transformations: How the EU Economic 
Constitution Changed During the Eurozone Crisis’, Common Market Law Review, 53, 2016, 
1245-1246. 
7 The provision has been copied and pasted in Article 7 Regulation (EU) No. 472/2013 of 21 
May 2013 on the strengthening of economic and budgetary surveillance of Member States in 
the euro area experiencing or threatened with serious difficulties with respect to their 
financial stability, [2013] OJ L140/1. 
Parliament and the Council adopted the so-called ‘Six-Pack’, a bundle of five 
Regulations and one Directive that strengthened both the preventive and corrective 
arms of the Stability and Growth Pact and introduced the Macro-Economic 
Imbalance Procedure.8 One of the Regulation of this package9 codified the European 
Semester, a policy coordination framework that brings under a single procedural 
umbrella both soft and hard coordination and surveillance mechanism.10 In May 
2013 the EU legislator adopted two further measures – the ‘two-pack’- aimed at 
strengthening economic and budgetary surveillance over Euro-States in difficulty 
and at monitoring budgetary plans of all Euro-States.11 
In March 2012, 25 out of 27 EU Member States signed the Treaty on Stability Co-
ordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union,12 known as the 
‘Fiscal Compact’, in order to send out unequivocal signs of their commitment toward 
budgetary probity. Indeed, the Fiscal Compact sets out, inter alia, stringent targets 
in terms of structural deficits, so to make sure that Contracting Parties’ budgetary 
                                                          
8 Regulation (EU) No. 1175/2011 of 16 November 2011 amending Council Regulation (EC) 
No. 1466/97 of 7 July 1997 on the strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary positions 
and the surveillance and coordination of economic policies, [2011] OJ L306/12; Regulation 
(EU) No. 1177/2011 of 8 November 2011 amending Council Regulation (EC) No. 1467/97 
of 7 July 1997 on speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficit 
procedure [2011] OJ L306/33; Regulation (EU) No. 1173/2011 of 16 November 2011 on the 
effective enforcement of budgetary surveillance in the Euro area [2011] OJ L306/1; Council 
Directive No. 2011/85/EU of 8 November 2011 on requirements for budgetary frameworks 
of the Member States, [2011] OJ L304/41; Regulation (EU) No. 1176/2011 of 16 November 
2011 on the prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances [2011] OJ L306/25 and 
Regulation (EU) No. 1174/2011 of the Council of 16 November 2011 on enforcement 
measures to correct excessive macroeconomic imbalances in the Euro area, [2011] OJ L306/8. 
9 Regulation (EU) No. 1175/2011, above n. 7. 
10 See generally M. Hallerberg, B. Marzinotto, G.B. Wolff, An Assessment of the European 
Semester, Study for the European Parliament’s Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs, 
2012 IP/A/ECON/ST/2010-24. 
11 Regulation No. 472/2013 of 21 May 2013 on the strengthening of economic and budgetary 
surveillance of Member States in the Euro area experiencing or threatened with serious 
difficulties with respect to their financial stability, [2013] OJ L140/1 and Regulation (EU) No. 
473/2013 of 21 May 2013 on common provisions for monitoring and assessing draft 
budgetary plans and ensuring the correction of excessive deficit of the Member States in the 
Euro area [2013] OJ L140/11. 
12 The Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union 
was signed in March 2012 by representatives of all EU Member States, but the UK and Czech 
Republic. It entered into force on 1 January 2013. For an analysis of its legal form and 
content, as well as its contradictory relationship with EU law, see P. Craig, ‘The Stability, 
Coordination and Governance Treaty: Principle, Politics and Pragmatism’, European Law 
Review, 37, 2012, 231-248. 
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position is balanced or in surplus.13 Moreover, Article 3(2) TSCG requires 
Contracting Parties to bring these rules into effect in their national legal orders 
“through provisions of binding force and permanent character”. 
These measures have had a profound impact on the fabric of the European 
integration process, engendering systemic14 conflicts with some of its foundational 
elements.15 This paper looks at the capacity of the system to deal with these conflicts 
in order to avoid that they may shake its foundations and further weaken the 
legitimacy of the integration process. In particular, the paper focuses on the role that 
the Court of Justice of the European Union (‘the Court’) has been able, and/or willing, 
to play when anti-crisis measures encroach upon fundamental social rights and, 
more in general, the balance between the social and the economic dimensions 
within the EU legal order. The first part looks at the departure from the rule of law 
in the context of bailout programmes devised to assist Member States that have been 
hard hit by the crisis. The second part focuses on the impact of anti-crisis measures 
on social rights, examining some of the defining features of the conditions attached 
to financial assistance packages. The third and fourth parts turn to the Court, 
critically analysing its role in the new European economic governance and its 
capacity to preserve some of the foundational elements of the EU legal order.  
 
2. The crisis, the EU and the demise of the Rule of Law 
Focusing on the financial assistance axis, Kilpatrick convincingly argued that “EU 
sovereign debt conditionality in ‘debtor states’ significantly troubles the Rule of 
Law”.16 To this end, she pointed to a number of key features of bailout instruments 
that threatens one of the cornerstone of the European integration process.  
                                                          
13 Article 3 TSCG.  
14 On this notion see A. Von Bogdandy, M. Ioannidis, ‘Systemic Deficiency in the Rule of Law: 
What It Is, What Has Been Done, What Can Be Done’, Common Market Law Review, 2014, 59-
96 
15 J.A. Menéndez, ‘The Existential Crisis of the European Union’, German Law Journal, 14(5), 
2013, 511-519. 
16 C. Kilpatrick, ‘On the Rule of Law and Economic Emergency: The Degradation of Basic 
Legal Values in Europe’s Bailouts’, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 2015, 325. See also F. 
Munari, ‘Crisi dell’Euro e crisi delle regole: Rule of Law o ragion politica? Il diritto 
dell’Unione europea dinanzi a nuove sfide’, in O. Porchia (ed.), Governance economica 
europea. Strumenti dell’Unione, rapporti con l’ordinamento internazionale e ricadute 
sull’ordinamento interno, Giappichelli: Torino (2015), 33-56. 
Bailout programs are often governed by a mixture of acts of uncertain legal 
nature, especially due to Member States’ recourse to intergovernmental 
mechanisms, such as the European Stability Mechanism, that operate outside the 
scope of EU law. The departure from the Rule of Law is even more evident in those 
cases where EU institutions and, in particular, the ECB resorted to informal tools, 
such as secret letters, to put pressure on some Member States in order to force them 
into socially painful structural adjustment programs.17 This is what happened, for 
instance, with Italy that, in August 2011, received a letter18 from the then-President 
of the ECB and the then-Governor of the Italian Central Bank detailing a list of 
measures that it had to take and even the legal instruments it had to use. The 
adoption of these reforms were considered as a condition to benefit from the 
purchase of sovereign debt paper on the secondary market in the context of the 
Securities Market Programme, although the letter did not make this link explicit. The 
same line of action has also been followed with Spain and, although using other 
forms of pressure, with Ireland,19 Cyprus20 and Greece.21 
                                                          
17 See generally A. Viterbo, ‘Legal and Accountability Issues Arising from the ECB’s 
Conditionality’, European Papers, 2016, 1, 501-531 
18 See 
http://www.corriere.it/economia/11_settembre_29/trichet_draghi_inglese_304a5f1e-
ea59-11e0-ae06-4da866778017.shtml?refresh_ce-cp 
19 In this case, the ECB played a key role to force the State to enter in a structural adjustment 
programme to be negotiated with the Troika. In a letter of 15 October 2010, Trichet 
reminded to then Irish Minister of Finance the ECB Governing Council’s powers and 
discretionality in applying collateral rules and in setting limits to ELA, In a subsequent letter 
of 19 November 2010, Trichet was even clearer on this point, by stating that “[i]t is the 
position of the Governing Council that it is only if we receive in writing a commitment from 
the Irish Government vis-à-vis the Eurosystem on the four following points that we can 
authorise further provision of ELA to Irish financial institutions: 1) The Irish government 
shall send a request for financial support to the Eurogroup; 2) The request shall include the 
commitment to undertake decisive actions in the areas of fiscal consolidation structural 
reforms and financial sector restructuring, in agreement with the European Commission, 
the IMF and the ECB […]”. Unsurprisingly the Irish Government bowed in, formally asking 
for financial assistance on the 20 November 2010. 
20 In a Decision of 21 March, the ECB Governing Council made clear that it would have 
rejected a request of Emergency Liquidity Assistance by Cyprus’ National Central Bank 
unless “an EU/IMF programme is in place that would ensure the solvency of the concerned 
banks”. Also in this case, the pressure put by the ECB was enough to convince the State. 
21 On 28 June and 6 July 2015, the ECB Governing Council twice decided to reject the request 
by the Greek National Central Bank to raise the Emergency Liquidity Assistance, forcing 
Greek authorities to impose a bank holiday and capital control. These decisions did not refer 
at all to the breakdown of the negotiations between Greece and EU institutions on the Third 
Assistance Package. However, it is telling that the very day in which the Tsipras Government 
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According to Joerges and Weimer, the reform of the EU economic architecture 
had an even deeper impact, perverting Europe’s economic constitution and its legal 
structure.22 In particular, it marks the definitive shift away from the ‘integration 
through law’ model toward a form of executive managerialism, which they see as 
the heir of the new governance model. The main casualties of this move are “the 
virtues of ‘old’ traditional law based upon ideas of representative democracy, 
command and control, rights protection and justiciability, and the stabilization of 
expectations via formal legal norms”.23   
Although diverging on several aspects, these perspectives concur on the fact that 
the departure from the rule of law has been a choice and not an accident. As it often 
happens in situations that are perceived as having an exceptional character,24 the 
respect for rules has been perceived as a constraint that could hamper and, thus, 
make less effective the response to the crisis. Therefore, the characterization of the 
crisis as an emergency situation allowed decision-makers to adopt exceptional 
measures to cope with it and getting rid of the constraints imposed by an allegedly 
ineffective legal framework. In this context, effectiveness has become the main, if 
not the only, feature that anti-crisis measures must possess, even at the expenses of 
legality.  
One of the most clear example and, at the same time, one of the most troublesome 
feature of this development is  the disregard of the principle of conferral and, thus, 
of the division of competences between States and the EU in key policy areas and, in 
particular, in the social sector. The new framework gives to EU institutions an 
unprecedented capacity to take part and influence decisions adopted by national 
authorities in domains reserved to Member States, as it reaches across the entire 
spectrum of the their economic and social policies. This is particularly evident with 
regard to States under financial assistance: structural adjustment programs give to 
EU institutions the capacity to exercise policy formulation, supervision and guidance 
                                                          
secured a Parliamentary vote on the measures that it pledged to obtain assistance from the 
EU, the ECB raised the ELA by 900 millions euros. 
22 C. Joerges, M. Weimer, A Crisis of Executive Managerialism in the EU: No Alternatives?, 
Maastricht Working Papers 2012-7, 20 
23 C. Joerges, M. Weimer, above n. 21, 15. 
24 The war on terror represents a good example in this regard. 
on issues, such as the provision of social services or the regulation of the labour 
market.25  
Referring to the case of implicit conditionality, Sacchi described the situation as 
an “extreme case of vertical […] integration in the policy arena, which goes well 
beyond what is generally meant by Europeanization, and cannot be captured 
through multilevel governance heuristic”. In his view, this transformation is better 
described as “a fusion ‘of responsibilities for the use of state instruments’”26. In the 
same vein, the strengthening of economic policy coordination and surveillance 
mechanisms has potentially heightened the level of involvement of EU institutions 
into domestic policymaking. Chalmers, in particular, described the regimes aiming 
at securing balanced budgets, avoiding excessive deficits and avoiding or correcting 
macroeconomic imbalances as a process of co-government that “goes to the 
structure and rationale of a State fiscal and welfare systems”.27  
This development is particularly troublesome also from a broader perspective, 
as it severely constrains political bargaining processes that should take place at 
national level.28 Indeed, in many cases national institutions – especially those of 
States under financial assistance – cannot but follow the line decided at 
supranational level, with little, if any, discretion. 
   
3. The Impact of Anti-Crisis Measures on Social Rights  
Reduction of social expenditure, modernization of social protection systems and 
reform of the labour market are ever-present ingredients in the recipes proposed in 
the menu of the EU anti-crisis strategy. These objectives are strongly reminiscent of 
those traditionally pursued by IMF-sponsored structural adjustment programmes 
back in the ‘80s and ‘90s, even though the IMF itself is now reconsidering the 
                                                          
25 F. Costamagna, Saving Europe Under Strict Conditionality: A Threat for EU Social 
Dimension?, LPF Working Paper no. 7, 2012. 
26 S. Sacchi, ‘Conditionality by Other Means: EU Involvement in Italy’s Structural Reforms in 
the Sovereign Debt Crisis’, Comparative European Politics, 13(1), 2015, 89. 
27 D. Chalmers, ‘The European Redistributive State and a European Law of Struggle’, 
European Law Journal, 18, 2012, 679-681. See also  
28 F. de Witte, ‘EU, Policy and the Social Question’, German Law Journal, 14(5), 2013, 581-
611. 
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wisdom of this approach.29 Some commentators have aptly dubbed such a 
paradoxical situation as the “European rescue of the Washington Consensus”.30  
Especially from 2010 onward, the priority of austerity-driven rescue packages 
was reducing sovereign debts, by invariably imposing draconian cuts to social 
expenditure. The attention toward this issue may be explained by referring to its 
relative weight in European States’ budgets, as social expenditure account for 
roughly 30% of the total. At the same time, this strategy seems to be fully in line with 
one of the dominant narratives of the crisis, according to which the latter had been 
mainly generated by the profligacy of Southern States and the excessive generosity 
of their welfare systems. This is very much evident in the case of States forced to 
enter into a structural adjustment programme in order to get financial assistance 
from the EU or from EU-related mechanisms. For instance, Greece and Hungary 
were forced to reduce their social expenditure by respectively 17% and 11% in the 
period 2007-201331. Moreover, it is worth observing that the First Economic 
Adjustment Programme for Greece envisaged cuts in health care expenditure 
amounting to more than 2 billion euro by 2015 and cuts in social benefits amounting 
to more than 5 billion euro by the same year to be achieved through, inter alia, a 
reduction of the monetary transfers to certain categories of vulnerable persons. In 
the third package approved in August 2015, Greek authorities committed to target 
savings of around ¼% of GDP in 2015 and around 1% of GDP by 2016 to improve 
the long-term sustainability of the pension system.  
A second component of the austerity-driven strategy is the promotion of internal 
devaluation, so to enable the ‘beneficiary’ State to regain external competiveness. In 
a context where currency devaluation is no longer an option32, the objective has 
been mostly pursued by reducing wages and other labour costs, making individual 
                                                          
29 S. Lütz, ‘From Washington Consensus to Flexible Keynesianism? The International 
Monetary Fund After the Financial Crisis’, Journal of International Organizations Studies, 6, 
2015, 85-98.  
30 S. Lütz, M. Kranke, The European Rescue of the Washington Consensus? EU and IMF Lending 
to Central and Eastern European Countries, LEQS Paper No. 22/2010 
31 OECD, Society at a Glance 2014. OECD Social Indicators, 2014 available at  
dx.doi.org/10.1787/soc_glance-2014-en 
32 Internal devaluation policies have been considered as “functional equivalents” to 
exchange rate flexibility. See generally K. Armigeon, L. Baccaro, Political Economy of the 
Sovereign Debt Crisis: The Limits of Internal Devaluation, in Industrial Law Journal, 41(3), 
2012, 254-275. 
and collective dismissals easier, forcing Member States to revise (or even dismantle) 
the wage–setting system, by giving precedence to individual over collective 
bargaining. This stems from the (belated) recognition that fiscal consolidation is not 
enough to promote growth and that there is the need to pursue it by mainly looking 
at the supply side. 
Over the years, there have been some attempts to pay greater attention to the 
social implications of financial assistance programmes. Article 7 of Regulation (EU) 
473/2013, on the strengthening of economic and budgetary surveillance of Member 
States in the euro area experiencing or threatened with serious difficulties with 
respect to their financial stability, represents a good example in this regard. The 
provision establishes that, when a Member State requests financial assistance, the 
draft macroeconomic adjustment programme has to take “into account the practice 
and institutions for wage formation and the national reform programme of the 
Member State concerned”, as well as to “fully observe Article 152 TFEU and Article 
28 of the Charter”. Likewise, the August 2015 Memorandum for Greece seems, at 
least on paper, more ‘socially-conscious’ that its predecessors. In particular, it 
explicitly recognizes the need for greater social justice, urging the Greek 
Government to “roll out a basic social safety net in the form of a Guaranteed 
Minimum Income”33 and praising the adoption of some measures aimed at 
supporting the most vulnerable part of the population.34   
Although certainly welcome, these attempts to work out a more balanced 
approach seem far too limited, especially if compared with the magnitude of the 
problem. Indeed, austerity measures contributed much to make the economic crisis 
evolve into a full-scale social crisis, having a severe negative impact on the 
enjoyment on a wide range of social rights, in particular with regard to certain 
groups, such as children, women, young and pensioners.  
The impact of austerity measures on social rights has been the objective of 
several studies. Notably, in January 2015 the European Parliament published a 
detailed comparative analysis regarding the impact on fundamental rights of 
austerity measures imposed in response to the crisis by seven EU Member States: 
                                                          
33 At 4. 
34 However, this praise sounds at bit paradoxical, as the adoption of these measures had 
been severely criticized by the donors at the time when they had been adopted. 
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Belgium, Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Spain and Portugal35. The analysis focused 
on a number of rights protected by the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and by the 
European Social Charter, such as education, healthcare, work, pension, access to 
justice, freedom of expression and assembly, housing, property and some rights at 
work. The findings of the study paint a bleak picture.  
For instance, with regard to the right to education, it found that reduction in the 
number of schools, in the number of teachers and of administrative and other 
school-related costs “include a danger to the overall quality of education and 
children’s success at school; an increase in unemployed workers in education; 
reduced availability of services [and] deterioration of general conditions in 
classrooms”. All these consequences being more intense for “[c]hildren with 
disabilities, Roma, Travellers’ children, as well as children of migrants”.36 
Furthermore, the study found that the massive reforms of the healthcare systems 
adopted in certain countries, such as Greece and Cyprus, primarily aimed at 
reducing costs through restricting access to healthcare, introducing or increasing 
participation fees, reducing salaries and freezing the employment of staff took an 
equally heavy toll on the enjoyment of the right to health. In particular these 
measures reduced access to healthcare, increased waiting times for treatments and 
unmet medical needs, as well as decreased preventive and protecting care. Also in 
this case, these effects were more acutely felt by the most vulnerable, such as poor 
and homeless people, older people, people with disabilities and their families, 
women, and undocumented migrants.37 The analysis comes to similarly 
troublesome conclusions also with regard to other rights, such as work-related ones 
and, in particular, the right to collective bargaining; the right to social security, as 
social benefits have been cut and access has been severely restricted in many States; 
and the right to housing, as foreclosures and evictions escalated in countries such as 
Spain.38    
 
                                                          
35 European Parliament, The Impact of Crisis on Fundamental Rights Across Member States of 
the EU. Comparative Analysis, Brussels, 2015.  
36 Ivi, 12. 
37 Ivi, 13. 
38 Ivi, 13-16. 
4. The Court of Justice and the Safeguard of Social Rights in Crisis   
4.1 The crisis, the reform of the European economic governance and the Court 
At least on paper, the reform of the European economic governance has 
strengthened the position of the Court.  
On the one hand, new legal instruments, even if adopted outside the EU legal 
order, conferred further competences to the Court. This is the case of Article 37 (3) 
ESM Treaty that gives to the Court the power to hear any dispute concerning the 
interpretation or the application of the Treaty. Furthermore, Article 8 Fiscal 
Compact empowers each Contracting Party to bring a claim before the Court when 
it considers that another Party failed to fully transpose, into its national legal order, 
the balanced budget rule, as provided for by Article 3(2) Fiscal Compact.39  
On the other hand, some commentators pointed out that the Court, together with 
some national supreme judicial bodies, has been very much involved in the fiscal 
domain, to a degree that is far higher than in the past and elsewhere. They 
considered that this has led to a level of judicial interference that is excessive, as 
decisions in this domain are better left with the political branches. They maintain 
that the main reason behind such an unprecedented judicial intervention in the 
fiscal domain is the recourse to international law instruments, which are more 
amenable to judicial review than EU ones.40    
However, the image of a stronger and pro-active Court can be hardly reconciled 
with the peripheral part that it has played with regard to the protection of social 
rights and, more generally, the safeguard of non-economic interests and values that 
have been badly affected by the austerity-driven reaction to the crisis.41 This 
contrasts starkly with the key role that it played in the construction of the EU legal 
architecture underpinning the European integration process, through the 
introduction of new principles - such as that concerning the protection of 
fundamental rights - that have contributed much to shape the European integration 
process as a whole. Indeed, as aptly observed by Poiares Maduro, the CJEU 
                                                          
39 See generally O. Porchia, ‘Il ruolo della Corte di Giustizia dell’Unione europea nella 
governance economica europea’, Il diritto dell’Unione europea, 593-612. 
40 F. Fabbrini, ‘The Euro-Crisis and the Courts: Judicial Review and the Political Process in 
Comparative Perspective’, Berkeley Journal of International Law, 32, 2014, 64-123. 
41 The Court is not alone in holding this position: see A. Hinarejos, ‘A Missed Opportunity: 
The Fundamental Rights Agency and the Euro Area Crisis’, European Law Journal, 22, 2016, 
61-73. 
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“promoted the use of law as […] a ‘mask for politics’ in European integration”, 
supplementing the work of the legislative process and compensating for the lack of 
consensus among Member States on key issues.42 To this end, the CJEU did make full 
use of the interpretative discretion left by EU rules, stretching them to the limit and, 
in many instances, even beyond.  
Conversely, in all the cases concerning austerity measures the CJEU has keenly 
accepted the limits posed by EU law to its capacity to review the legality of such 
measures. Most of these solutions are defensible,43 resting upon a flawless, even 
though quite formalistic, reading of the relevant provisions. Nonetheless, some of 
the conclusions reached by the CJEU contrast with the much more liberal approach 
that it had adopted in several instances, showing that the CJEU was not just unable 
to play its part, but, to a large extent, unwilling to do so.  
 
4.2 The systematic rejection of annulment actions brought by private applicants 
The first line of relevant cases concerns the claims brought to the CJEU by private 
applicants seeking the annulment of acts addressed to a Member State in the context 
of a financial assistance programme. 
A recent and fitting example in this regard is the Ledra case,44 concerning the 
ESM intervention to assist Cyprus in the management of the difficulties faced by two 
of its biggest banks and, consequently, to avoid contagion. ESM financial assistance, 
which lasted from 2013 to 2016, was granted on the back of a macro-economic 
adjustment programme set by a MoU to be negotiated between the Troika and the 
Cypriot authorities. Negotiations started in 2012 and ended in April 2013, when the 
MoU was signed by the Commission, on behalf of the ESM, the Central Bank of 
Cyprus and the Minister of Finance of Cyprus. In the meanwhile, the Cypriot 
authorities put the two largest Cypriot banks into resolution and provided for the 
recapitalisation of one of them, at the expenses of uninsured depositors, 
shareholders and bondholders. Some of them, after having seen a substantial 
decrease in the value of their deposits, turned to the EU General Court seeking the 
                                                          
42 M. Poiares Maduro, We the Court. The European Court of Justice and the European 
Economic Constitution, Hart Publishing: Oxford (1998), 17-19. 
43 F. Munari, above n. 16, 49. 
44 Judgment of 20 September 2016, Ledra Advertising at al., Joined cases C-8/15 to C-10/15 
P, ECLI:EU:C:2016:701. 
annulment of the parts of the MoU providing for the restructuring of the banks. In 
this case, the General Court45 swiftly rejected the claim, pointing to the fact that the 
MoU had been adopted by the Republic of Cyprus and the ESM and, thus, not being 
an act of an EU institution, body, office or agency, its legality cannot be review under 
Article 263 TFEU.  
The CJEU came to the same conclusion also in cases where the challenge was 
directed toward EU acts. In the ADEDY case,46 for instance, a public sector trade 
union sought the annulment of two Council decisions addressed to Greece aiming at 
reinforcing and deepening fiscal surveillance, as well as pushing through measures 
for the reduction of an excessive deficit. Applicants argued that, inter alia, the two 
acts violated the principle of conferral, enshrined in Article 5(2) TEU. The General 
Court dismissed the action, as it considered that the applicants had no standing to 
bring it. Indeed, Article 263(4) TFUE provides that natural or legal persons can 
institute an annulment proceeding only in those cases where the act, if not 
addressed to them, is “of direct and individual concern to them”. The General Court 
focused exclusively on the requirement of direct concern and, having found that it 
had not been fulfilled and having considered that the two conditions are cumulative, 
it declared the action inadmissible without having to take into consideration the 
other one. In particular, it observed that the acts not only were addressed to Greece, 
but were also very general in content, leaving much discretionary space to Greek 
authorities as to the selection of the concrete measures to be adopted in order to 
reduce the deficit. Therefore, applicants were not in the position to claim that the 
EU decisions were of direct concern to them.  
This conclusion is in line with a well-settled case law and it did not come as a 
surprise. The same goes also with a final remark made by the Court, dismissing the 
incompatibility between the inadmissibility decision and the right to effective 
judicial protection. Following, also in this case, a usual path,47 the Court pointed out 
                                                          
45 Order of 10 November 2014, Ledra Advertising Ltd, T-289/13, EU:T:2014:981, paras. 56-
63. 
46 Order of 27 November 2011, Anotati Dioikisi Enoseon Dimosion Ypallilon (ADEDY), 
Spyridon Papaspyros and Ilias Iliopoulos v Council of the European Union, T-15 /11, 
EU:T:2012:627 
47 However this line of reasoning has been much contested also within the CJEU, as the strict 
interpretation of the conditions for admissibility of action brought by private applicants 
were considered to be incompatible with the right to an effective judicial remedy: see 
Judgment of 3 May 2002, Jego-Quéré, T-177/01, EU:T:2002:112. The judgment was 
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that the remedy provided for under Article 263(4) TFUE is not to be considered in 
isolation, as it represents just one of the possibilities available to private parties to 
challenge the validity of EU acts having a general character. Indeed, private parties 
can bring their claim in front of national courts and, then, ask them to make a 
reference to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling on the validity of the contested acts. 
As confirmed in ADEDY, the annulment procedure and the preliminary reference 
one establish “a complete system of legal remedies and procedures designed to 
enable the European Union Courts to review the legality of acts of the institutions” 
 
4.3 A truly “complete system of legal remedies”? Austerity measures outside the 
reach of the Charter 
The application of the ‘complete system’ doctrine does not seems to offer many 
reasons for hope with regard to the capacity of the Court to play a more active role 
for the protection of rights threatened by austerity measures. Indeed, so far the CJEU 
has rejected all the requests for preliminary rulings submitted by national courts, 
showing, in particular, much reluctance to apply the EU Charter on Fundamental 
Rights (‘the Charter’) in cases concerning anti-crisis measures.  
In this regard, the case that set the tone was Pringle,48 one of the few decided by 
the Court sitting in plenary session. The case originated from a referral by the Irish 
High Court, which had been asked to ascertain whether, by ratifying the ESM Treaty, 
Ireland would have undertaken obligations in contravention with several provisions 
of EU law and, in particular, with the norms on the protection of fundamental rights, 
as contained in the Charter. The Court answered in the negative, observing that in 
the case at hand the Charter does not find application. According to Article 51 of the 
Charter, its provisions are addressed to Member States only when they are 
implementing EU law and, according to the Court, this condition was not fulfilled in 
the case at stake. Indeed, “Member States are not implementing Union law […] when 
they establish a stability mechanism such as the ESM where […] the EU and FEU 
Treaties do not confer any specific competence on the Union to establish such a 
                                                          
subsequently set aside by the Court, which considered that the then Court of First Instance 
erred in law, as it failed to duly consider that “the Treaty has established a complete system 
of legal remedies and procedures designed to ensure review of the legality of acts of the 
institutions” (Judgment of 1 April 2004, Jego-Quéré, C-263/02, EU:C:2004:210).   
48 Judgment of 27 November 2012, Pringle, C-370/12, EU:C:2012:756.  
mechanism”.49 Regrettably, the Court did not conclusively address the other issue 
on the table, i.e. whether the Charter applies when EU institutions, such as the 
Commission and the European Central Bank, act within the context of the ESM 
Treaty, as it happens, for instance, when they participate to the definitions of the 
conditions attached to the assistance package. In this regard, it is worth considering 
that, in her conclusions on the case, Advocate General Kokott made clear that the 
Commission “as such is bound by the full extent of European Union law, including 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights”.50  
The CJEU adopted an equally restrictive stance with regard to the applicability of 
the Charter in cases directly concerning the legality of austerity measures. A good 
example in this regard is the Order adopted by the Court in Sindicato dos Bancarios 
do Norte and Others.51 The case concerned the Portuguese bailout and, in particular, 
a number of measures aimed, as clarified in the Implementing Decision 
2011/344/EU,52 at “strengthening labour market functioning by limiting severance 
payments and making working time arrangements more flexible” by the end of 
2011, as provided for by the Memorandum of Understanding. The Portuguese 
Government honoured its commitments with the Budget Law for 2011, which 
imposed, inter alia, cuts to public sector wages and suspended the payment of 
bonuses. Public sectors trade unions challenged these measures in front of the 
employment tribunal of Porto that, in turn, referred a number of preliminary 
questions to the Court. In particular, it asked whether the right to fair and just 
working conditions, as enshrined in Article 31 of the Charter, prevented the 
reduction of workers’ salary, when there is no modification of the collective 
agreement. Moreover, the Portuguese tribunal also asked whether the same 
provision is to be interpreted as imposing a remuneration that allow the worker to 
maintain a satisfactory standard of living. Lastly, it asked whether salary cuts, 
insofar as they are not the only available measure to ensure the sustainability of 
                                                          
49 Para. 180. 
50 View of 26 October 2012, Pringle, C-370/12, EU:C:2012:675, para. 176. See see C. 
Kilpatrick, ‘Are the Bailouts Immune to EU Social Challenge Because They Are Not EU Law?’, 
European Constitutional Law Review, 10, 2015, 405-406. 
51 Order of 7 March 2013, Sindicato dos Bancarios do Norte and Others, C-128/12, 
EU:C:2013:149 
52 Council Implementing Decision no. 2011/344/EU of 30 May 2011 on granting Union 
financial assistance to Portugal [2011] OJ L159/88. 
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public finances, contravene Article 31 of the Charter, as they put at risk the standard 
of living of the affected workers. The Court refused to hear any of these questions, 
claiming that it had no jurisdiction to take cognisance of the requests. Indeed, it 
confirmed that the Charter does not find application in this case, since, when 
Portugal adopted the contested measures, it was not implementing EU law. 
The strict interpretation of the conditions regulating the applicability of the 
Charter seems compatible with the black letter of Article 51 of the Charter, which 
establishes that the Charter applies to member States “only when they are 
implementing Union law”. However, there has been instances where the Court opted 
for a much liberal reading of the provision, allowing for the application of the 
Charter in cases where the State concerned was not implementing EU law. A case 
that stands out in this regard is Åkerberg Fransson, a judgment concerning an alleged 
violation of the ne bis in idem principle enshrined in Article 50 of the Charter.53 Mr. 
Fransson, having been charged for serious tax offences, had first been ordered to 
pay a hefty tax surcharge by the Swedish Tax Board and, then, criminally prosecuted 
for these very offences. From our perspective, the most interesting issue is that 
neither the Tax Board, nor the Prosecutor were implementing EU law when they 
imposed the penalties on Mr. Fransson or when they decided to prosecute him. This 
notwithstanding, the Court established that the Charter could find application in the 
case at hand, as it considered that the existence of a link, even though quite tenuous, 
between the offences committed by Mr Fransson and EU law would suffice to this 
end. In particular, the Court pointed to the fact that some of these breaches 
concerned the obligation to declare VAT, which, in turn, is one of the sources of EU’s 
own resources and it is regulated by EU primary and secondary norms. This 
element, according to the Court, was enough to draw the situation under the scope 
of EU law and, thus, to make the Charter applicable. This broad reading of the 
conditions governing the application of EU fundamental rights norms refers back to 
case law predating the entry into force of the Charter and it used by the CJEU to 
broaden its scope of application vis-à-vis Member States.  
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It is clear that, had the Court followed the same interpretive approach when 
faced with challenges directed against austerity measures, it would have come to 
different conclusions as to the applicability of the Charter. Indeed, the measures at 
stake had been adopted in the context of structural adjustment programs negotiated 
with EU institutions, in accordance to procedures governed by EU law and to pursue 
objectives, such as the reduction of the excessive deficits, sanctioned by EU norms. 
In a word, they clearly have a much stronger link with the EU legal order than those 
in Åkerberg Fransson. 
 
4.4 The ‘complete system’ doctrine avenged? The action for damages as a (so far) 
illusory new dawn 
A recent decision by the Court of Justice seems to open up new avenues for 
individuals lamenting a violation of their rights by measures adopted in the context 
of a structural adjustment program. In the above-mentioned Ledra judgment, the 
Court of Justice declared the admissibility of an action for damages brought by a 
number of Cypriot investors against the Commission and the ECB for their role in 
the negotiation and conclusion of the MoU. As seen above, the latter document 
detailed a series of measures to be adopted by Cypriot authorities as a condition to 
obtain financial assistance by the ESM. In particular, applicants claimed that the 
Commission and the ECB played a key role in devising the bail-in implemented by 
Cypriot authorities in a way that made their bank deposits’ value drop dramatically 
and,, thus, violating their right to property, enshrined in Article 17 of the Charter. On 
this point, the Court overturned the decision of the General Court and distanced 
itself from the path suggested by Advocate General Wahl.  
The General Court, in a Order issued on November 2014, rejected the claims for 
compensation on several different grounds. First, it found that there was no act, nor 
course of action, that could be imputed to the Commission or the ECB, since the ESM 
Treaty does not confer to them any power to take autonomous decisions. 
Consequently, the acts adopted in that context “solely commit the ESM”54 and the 
Court has no jurisdiction to consider a claim that is based on the illegality of an act 
that does not originate from an EU institution acting within the EU. Secondly, it 
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excluded that the Commission could incur responsibility for having failed to fully 
exercise its role as guardian of the Treaties, as provided for in Article 17 TEU. In 
particular, it opined that the alleged omission did not meet one of the conditions for 
the admissibility of the action for damages, that of the existence of a causal link 
between the behaviour of the institution and the damage. Indeed, the decree that 
determined the severe reduction of the value of claimants’ deposits was adopted 
before the conclusion of the MoU and, consequently, the Commission could have 
done nothing to avert the losses. 55   
The Advocate General’s Opinion56 was, up to a certain point, broadly in line with 
the arguments put forward by the General Court. After excluding that the MoU could 
be directly imputed to either the Commission or the ECB, he offered a distinctively 
restrictive reading of Pringle and, in particular, of the paragraph where the Court 
hinted at the existence of an obligation for the Commission to ensure the consistency 
of the MoU with EU law.57 Further he drew an unpersuasive parallel between the 
discretionality that the Commission enjoy in the context of the infringement 
procedure and the situation at stake, going as far as maintaining that “it cannot be 
argued that every time the Commission breaches a specific Treaty provision, or does 
not prevent such a provision being breached by another entity, that breach amounts 
to an infringement of the general provision of Article 17 TEU”. All these elements led 
him to conclude that there was no duty for the Commission to act in case of 
incompatibility between bail-out instruments and EU law and, thus, no 
responsibility could arise. For good measure, the Advocate General also excluded 
the applicability of the Charter when the Commission acts outside the EU legal 
framework. In his final remarks, AG Wahl admitted that aggrieved individuals 
should not look for remedies within the EU legal order, but at national or 
international level. As for the latter, he took the UN Draft Articles on the 
Responsibility of international Organizations as a “source of inspiration”58 to 
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conclude that only the ESM, and possibly Member States, can be held responsible for 
the acts adopted in the context of ESM-sponsored financial assistance programmes.  
Conversely, the Court of Justice declared the action for damages admissible, at 
least with regard to the Commission. The fact that the MoU falls outside the scope of 
application of EU law – the Court observed – does not bar applicants from bringing 
an action for compensation. Indeed, this element is relevant for the admissibility of 
an action for annulment, but not in the case at stake. The two actions are 
autonomous59 and their admissibility depends on the fulfilment of different 
conditions. The Court of Justice, then, turned to address the crux of the matter, i.e. 
whether the Commission is bound to ensure the respect of EU law even when acting 
outside the EU legal order. Pringle had been quite reticent on this point, as it 
mentioned Article 17 TEU without drawing any conclusion. Ledra represents a step 
forward in that regard: moving from the premise that the participation to the ESM 
activities cannot alter the powers conferred to the institution by the Treaties, the 
Court inferred that “the Commission retains, […] within the framework of the ESM 
Treaty, its role of guardian of the Treaties as resulting from article 17(1) TEU”. For 
this reason, it is bound to “refrain from signing a memorandum of understanding” 
even in the case “it doubts” its consistency with EU law.  
Such a conclusion rests on the assumption that the primacy of EU law operates 
not only with regard to domestic law, but also with regard to agreements concluded 
between Member States.60 What the Court is saying, without making it explicit, is 
that Article 17 TEU, mandating the Commission to act as guardian of the Treaties, 
prevails over Article 13(4) ESM Treaty, which establishes that the “Commission 
shall sign the MoU on behalf of the ESM” when the document is approved by the 
Board of Governors. In this regard, the Court is seemingly sending a strong message 
to EU institutions or, at least, to the Commission, making clear that their freedom of 
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action in the context of intergovernmental mechanism created by Member States is 
not unlimited.  
The judgment represents a remarkable step forward, as it is the first case where 
the Court has finally admitted the possibility that bailout measures are, to some 
extent, amenable to judicial review also in the EU legal order. However, the sense of 
relief quickly evaporates if one considers the part of the judgment on the merit of 
the case. The Court concluded that no damages could be awarded, since claimants 
failed to establish a sufficiently serious breach of a rule of law and, more in detail, a 
violation of claimants’ right to property. The main problem does not lie with the 
conclusion – which is by and large convincing in the light of the circumstances of the 
case -, but with the argumentative path followed by the Court to get there.  
The Court began with making clear that when acting in the context of the ESM 
Treaty, the Commission is bound to respect and to ensure respect for the Charter. 
Therefore, it had the duty to make sure that the MoU was consistent with the rights 
guaranteed therein and, in particular, with the right to property, contained in Article 
17. Subsequently, it observed that, under the Charter, this right is not absolute, as it 
can be subject to restrictions. However, Article 52(1) Charter establishes that 
limitations to the exercise of any right are possible only in so far as they pursue an 
objective of general interest, comply with the principle of proportionality and does 
not impair the essence of the right.  
The Court enumerated all the conditions, but it then contented itself with just 
one of them, i.e. the fact the impugned measures pursued an objective of general 
interest. Little, if any, attention is devoted to their proportionality and to their 
capacity to preserve the essence of the right. The importance of the objective 
pursued by the measures – ensuring the stability of the banking system and of the 
euro area as a whole – it is enough, in the eyes of the Court, to conclude that they “do 
not constitute a disproportionate and intolerable interference impairing the very 
essence of the appellants’ right to property”. Without any need to consider the 
suitability of the measures to reach the stated objectives, their necessity or whether 
a fair balance had been struck with other competing objectives.61  
                                                          
61 The Court seems to have taken very seriously the suggestion of some commentators who 
argue that, instead than putting these measures outside the reach of EU law, the Court 
should address the merit of the cases, granting a wide margin of discretion to decision-
makers in order to preserve their autonomy of action. See C. Barnard, ‘The Charter, the 
This approach can be read as offering a stark – and troublesome – confirmation 
of the deep impact of the crisis on the EU constitutional fabric and, in particular, on 
the relationship between different objectives therein. Ensuring the financial 
stability in the euro area has become a sort of a trump card that just needs to be 
invoked in order to prevail over any other competing objective.62 Furthermore, the 
refusal of the Court to engage in any sort of proportionality review of the measures 
send a worrisome message to future applicants. Should the Court confirm this 
approach, the chance of success of actions brought against austerity measures are 
almost non-existent, since all these measures aim at restoring or preserving the 
stability of the euro area.      
 
5. Concluding remarks 
The analysis shows that the Court has consistently adopted a non-interventionist 
stance with regard to judicial actions challenging the compatibility of austerity 
measures with key principles of EU law, such as the protection of fundamental 
rights. This finding still holds true after the Ledra judgment, where the Court 
declared the admissibility of damages actions brought by Cypriot investors against 
the Commission and the ECB, but it then rejected them by avoiding to exercise any 
meaningful control on the impugned measures.  
This choice can be viewed as an attempt by the Court not to interfere with 
decisions taken by political bodies – being them national or supranational ones – to 
cope with an emergency situation. This is nothing new, as there are many examples 
where courts have decided to refrain from constraining the capacity of the 
legislative or, more often, executive power to (re-)act in the face of an emergency.63  
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However, the Court seems to have gone too far and such an approach is 
problematic under many accounts. In particular, the choice of the Court not to 
engage with these issues reveals its passive acceptance of the demise of the role that 
the law can play in the response to the crisis and the construction of a new 
architecture.64 This is all the more disturbing in the context of the European Union 
that, as the Court itself has proudly repeated several time and it has been codified in 
the Preamble of the Charter, is “based on the rule of law”. The situation is further 
compounded by the effects that the managerialist turn, and it blind adherence to 
fiscal austerity, is having on what can be broadly defined as the ‘European social 
model’. In this context, the Court’s unwillingness – and not just inability - to fully 
exercise its role do not certainly do any good in restoring the legitimacy of the 
European integration process. 
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